THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, transl. Rex Warner, Penguin,
Harmondsworth, 1970 (1954).

Thucydides (c. 455-400 B.C.E.) wrote a highly esteemed account of the
great clash between the two powerful Greek states of Athens and Sparta
from 431 to 404 B.C.E. An example of modern admiration for the relative
quality of this ancient historian may be seen in this translator's
statement on p. 5

   I believe that in his History of the Peloponnesian War Thucydides has
   written the greatest work on politics, in the widest sense, that ever
   has been written. Brilliant as are his accounts of battles and
   seditions, what gives his history its supreme importance is the
   imprint of his own vigorous and enquiring mind, which is never for a
   moment deflected by the temptations of sensationalism or conventional
   judgement. His subject is not only the conflict, both military and
   spiritual, between Athens and Sparta, but human nature itself, as it
   is expressed in political action. p. 5

Thucydides begins by saying that he realized from the start that this
war polarizing the Greek states was going to be extensive and started to
write his history as the conflict began. He speaks of the significance
of naval warfare. He comments on history, and on one aspect of Classical
historiography he is very up front:

   In this history I have made use of set speeches some of which were
   delivered just before and others during the war. I have found it
   difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches which I
   listened to myself and my various informants have experienced the
   same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as close as
   possible to the general sense of the words that were actually used,
   to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each
   situation. p. 24

This may in general be understood as the way Classical historians did
their work, though most do not say so. Polybius (c. 200-118 B.C.E.) is
an exception in not composing such speeches.

The translator speaks of Athenian "democratic imperialism" (p. 6) and on
page 55 an Athenian envoy asserts in one of these set speeches:

   "It has always been a rule that the weak should be subject to the
   strong; and besides, we consider that we are worthy of our power. Up
   till the present moment you, too, used to think that we were; but
   now, after calculating your own interest, you are beginning to talk
   in terms of right and wrong. Considerations of this kind have never
   yet turned people aside from the opportunities of aggrandizement
   offered by superior strength." p. 55

One of the great themes of the work is the failure of Athens, even when
voting as a  democracy, to resist the temptations of such opportunity
for aggrandizement. The epitome of this is the ill fated expedition to
Sicily. There was advice against this, but the majority voted with the
impressive Alcibiades:

   He wanted to oppose Nicias, with whom he had never seen eye to eye in
   politics and who had just now made a personal attack on him in his
   speech. Stronger motives still were his desire to hold the command
   and his hopes that it would be through him that Sicily and Carthage
   would be conquered - successes which would at the same time bring him
   personally both wealth and honour. p. 376

The invasion was approved, though Alcibiades was not trusted to lead it.
The Athenians were completely defeated.

   This was the greatest Hellenic action that took place during this
   war, and, in my opinion, the greatest action that we know of in
   Hellenic history - to the victors the most brilliant of successes,
   to the vanquished the most calamitous of defeats; for they were
   utterly and entirely defeated; their sufferings were on an enormous
   scale; their losses were, as they say, total; army, navy, everything
   was destroyed, and, out of many, only few returned. So ended the
   events in Sicily. p. 488

The disaster was made worse by the astounding reaction the Athenians
took to an eclipse of the moon occurring as they prepared to withdraw.
Instead of sailing away under cover of darkness, they felt they had to
remain another month. That was enough to permit their total defeat. This
is also described in Plutarch's (1st Century C.E.) Life of Nicias (in
Penguin's THE RISE AND FALL OF ATHENS pp. 236-237) where Plutarch also
speaks of the natural causes of eclipses.

Thucydides describes one of the deadly consequences of war, both in the
Athenian action against Syracuse on Sicily and in the defence of Athens
from Sparta. Sieges with many people crowded in unsanitary conditions
cause the rapid spread of disease, compounded often by hunger. Athens
withdrew behind its walls and suffered this fate. On page 123 he writes
the plague was widespread, originating in Africa and spreading through
the Persian Empire and for Athens beginning in her port of Piraeus. It
claimed many lives and the outstanding statesman Pericles died two and a
half years into the war.

Among the many interesting points of this work is the quoting of the
Treaty (pages 319-321) that was hoped would provide fifty years of peace
between the Athenians and the Spartans.

This is a highly significant work, more so than this brief review may
suggest, though the quotes above do offer some suggestion of its insight
into human contention within states and among states.

michael McKenny, June 20, 2006 C.E.


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