Conflicting Missions, Piero Gleijeses, University of North Carolina
Press, Chapel Hill and London, 2002

Acknowledgements (xiii-xiv): Among many mentioned are: Setsuko Ono,
Belgian ambassador Jean de Ruyth, Havana University's Gloria Leon,
Cuban Central Committee member Jorge Risquet, US Assistant Secretary
Nathaniel Davis and Nancy Mitchell. The staffs of US presidential
libraries are also thanked. Some Cuban archival material was made
available for this book.

Prologue (5-11): African independence presented US policy makers with
significant challenges. As media showed mistreatment of US Blacks,
Soviet and Chinese influence grew; Cuba was not considered by US Africa
analysts. Cuba's support of Africa was enormous.

1. "Castro's Cuba 1959-1964" (12-29): The US promptly recognized 
Castro's administration and appointed a favourable ambassador. Castro's
determined independence soon altered US intentions. Cuba, even after
defeating Bay of Pigs invaders, made overtures. Washington chose
destabilization and attempts to overthrow Castro. He turned to Moscow.
Soviets provided weapons. Withdrawal of missiles lessened Cuban respect
for the USSR and increased insecurity. In late 1963 Kennedy, continuing
destabilization, tentatively responded to Cuban reconcilation moves;
Johnson only opposed Cuba.

In 1964 a meeting of Latin American Communist parties in Havana agreed
Cuba would promote revolution in the region only with the approval of
concerned national parties. Cuba increased its African focus.

2. "Cuba's First Venture in Africa: Algeria" (30-56): Cuba strongly
supported Algerian independence. Ahmad Ben Bella, resisting US
pressure, visited Cuba in late 1962. He was much impressed. Castro
urged Cuban doctors help Algeria. On May 24, 1963, fifty five Cubans
arrived. When Morocco's King Hassan II disputed Algeria's borders and
seized territory, Cuba sent troops and heavy weapons; Hassan II quickly
respected Algeria's borders. Cubans trained Algerians, provided weapons
and much appreciated free medical care.

Algeria and Cuba worked together to promote Latin American revolution.
In June 1965 Ben Bella was overthrown in a coup; relations cooled.

3. "Flee! The White Giants are Coming!" (57-76): Fearing potential
Communism in Zanzibar, the US pressured England, whose troops already
had quashed non-Communist mutinies in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, to
intervene. The UK declined. The US gradually overcame suspicions of
Cuban involvement in Zanzibar. On April 26, 1964, Tanganyika and
Zanzibar formed Tanzania.

The US opposed Zaire's charismatic, nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba;
he was overthrown, brutalized and killed. Katangan separatism was
suppressed. The CIA confronted uprising in Western Zaire. Eastern Zaire
had widespread popular revolt. The US vainly urged Belgian, then
European Community, intervention. Refusal displeased the Secretary of
State:

   Rusk did not mince words. He told the Belgian ambassador that he was
   "bitter that the European governments had refused to intervene in
   Zaire, even though the African continent was above all their
   responsibility." He added, the ambassador reported, "that if Zaire
   were to be lost because of the European failure to act, it would
   have a profound impact on US-European relations." p. 68

US backed mercenaries went, savaged Zaire and openly described their
barbarities to the press. When US planes dropped Belgian paratroopers
into Stanleyville, there was outrage throughout Africa and beyond.

4. "Castro Turns to Central Africa" (77-100): Lumumba's demise
confirmed Cuban understanding law and truth were insufficient in face
of US violence. In December 1964 at the UN, Che Guevara denounced US
actions against Cuba and Zaire. He called for Zaire to be avenged. He
left New York for a lengthy African visit. The US prevented Dahomey
from establishing relations. Che impressed many by his outspoken Afro
centric attitude. A side trip to China was largely unsuccessful at
calming displeasure there with Cuba's closeness to Moscow.

In Brazzaville Che met with Congolese and MPLA Angolan independence
movement leaders. He promised aid. In Tanzania Che's good friend Pablo
Rivalta was ambassador. Che's concept of concentrated revolutionary
struggle in Zaire displeased leaders of revolutionary movements from a
number of other countries. Zairean revolutionary leader Laurent Kabila
impressed Che who personally led Cuban military instructors to Zaire.

A US backed coup overthrew Brazil's government. The US pressured other
Latin American countries to boycott Cuba; Mexico alone resisted. In
April 1965, US forces occupied the Dominican Republic. This and the
bombing of Vietnam made Cuba apprehensive. In May 1965, a Cuban ship
unloaded arms in Guinea and sailed on to East Africa.

5. "Che in Zaire" (101-123): Che, mourning revolutionaries killed in
Argentina, went in disguise to Zaire. His letter to Fidel Castro
resigning his Cuban posts expresses his high esteem of Fidel. The
Cubans found much disorganization. Top Zairean revolutionaries were
absent. While waiting, Che and another doctor began treating the sick.
Che suffered from malaria and asthma. A leading Zairean revolutionary
drowned. A first attack was easily repulsed. Che encouraged demoralized
Cubans.

Kabila visited once briefly. Che at last without permission went to the
front. There were some successes. Other prominent Cubans arrived. On
October 22nd communications specialists and equipment linked Che to the
Cuban embassy in Tanzania, thence home. Havana learned the grim truth.

6. "A Successful Covert Operation" (124-136): The US put a positive
spin on White mercenaries, euphemized as "special volunteers." Western
media barely mentioned mercenary atrocities. US economic pressure muted
African voices outraged by US activity in Zaire. The CIA built patrol
boats to cut revolutionaries' supply lines across Lake Tanganyika. The
CIA was slow to realize the extent of Cuban presence in Zaire.

7. "American Victory" (137-159): Severe pressure by air, land and lake
scattered Zairean revolutionaries. Zaire's president sacked his
detested prime minister. Zaire now had OAU support. Tanzania politely
awaited Cuban withdrawal. Zaire's revolutionaries ceased fighting. On
November 21, 1965, Che led the Cubans from Zaire.

Three documents the author received before Benigno left Cuba verify
assertions he was not in Zaire; his personal accounts of Zaire are not
historical. On November 25th, Mobutu seized power in Zaire. Che spent
three months in Dar-es-Salaam recuperating and writing analyses of the
failed mission. This subsequently enabled avoidance of mistakes in
Guinea-Bissau. In 1967 remaining mercenaries failed to unseat Mobutu,
held out in Bukavu, left Zaire and were flown to Europe.

8. "Cubans in the Congo" (160-184): Ben Bella's overthrow made Congo
(Brazzaville) and Tanzania Cuba's chief centres in Africa. In August
1965, the US, claiming harrassment and relying on France, closed its
embassy in Brazzaville. Cuba sent two hundred and fifty troops. It
provided medical expertise, inoculated children and granted Congolese
scholarships.

On June 27th, an elite army unit rebelled. Cubans protected the radio
station and the government. The president returned from abroad. The
army returned to barracks. Assessing Congo's vocally revolutionary
government safe from external attack, Cuba withdrew troops. Cuba
supported Angolan independence efforts in Cabinda. Portuguese forces
repelled this effort. Cuban trained fighters ventured through nearly
two hundred miles of Zaire to reach Angola. In addition to Portuguese,
both Zaireans and rival Angolan independence fighters opposed them.
Cuban trained Camerooonian revolutionaries were promptly defeated.

9. "Guerrillas in Guinea-Bissau" (185-213): On January 12, 1965, Che
met impressive Amilcar Cabral. Cuba assisted Guinea-Bissau where things
were going well. Aware of Cuban presence ("'But it soon became public
knowledge that the men who were driving the PAIGC trucks were Cubans;
they were the only people in Conakry who smoked cigars!"'p. 189), the
US discounted it.

Portugal used US arms, including fighter aircraft, against Africans; US
concern was that this not become public knowledge. Cabral limited
foreign participation to Cubans only. PAIGC leaders later clarified:

   "The Cubans were a special case because we knew that they, more than
   anyone else, were the champions of internationalism," one recalled.
   "Cuba made no demands, it gave us unconditional aid," said another.
   p. 199

Cuban doctors impressively provided much of Guinea-Bissau's medical
service.

Castro's first visit to Africa was to Conakry in May 1972. This lead to
further significant aid, as always with no mention of repayment. On
November 14, 1972, the UN recognized the PAIGC as Guinea-Bissau's
legitimate government. The vote was 98 to 6 with 8 abstentions. The US
was one of the six. Portugual achieved Cabral's assassination on
January 20, 1973. Soviet anti-aircraft missiles eliminated Portugual's
single advantage. The Portuguese coup on April 25, 1974 ended the war.

10. "Castro's Cuba, 1965-1975" (214-229): Cuba continued to support
Latin American revolutionaries, especially in Columbia, Guatemala,
Venezuela and Bolivia, this last considered so vital Che went there in
October 1966. His defeat and death in 1967, other reverses and the
pending election of Richard Nixon caused apprehensive Cuba to reconcile
with the USSR. Castro now considered electoral victories possible;
Chile confirmed this. Castro respected Allende's wishes and the coup
occurred without Cuban weapons in the equation.

At home:

   "As long as the US successfully maintains its present economic
   pressures, the prospect for much significant improvement in Cuba's
   drab economic performance is remote," a senior INR specialist
   concluded in late 1967. ("Furthermore," he wrote, "the fear of
   potential US aggression impels the regime to divert disproportionate
   resources to military preparedness.") p. 222

Modification of economic policy, increased Soviet aid, rising sugar and
nickel prices and reduced effectiveness of the US embargo (In July 1975
the OAS, including the US, voted to remove 1964 sanctions) contributed
to economic recovery. Cuba in 1973 sent military advisers to the Middle
East. These included a thousand tankists who went to Syria in November.
Progressive African governments faced coups in the late 60s. Cuban aid
to Africa continued into the 70s. The US little noted this.

11. "The Collapse of the Portuguese Empire" (230-245): Portugual's new
government recognized independent Guinea-Bissau in September 1974 and
Mozambique in June 1975. On January 15, 1975, an agreement was signed
providing for joint Portugese and Angola's three independence groups'
administration, the election of a constituent assembly and withdrawal
in stages of Portuguese troops. The MPLA requested Cuban assistance. In
November 1974, Cuba sent Carlos Cadelo and Alfonso Peres Morales to
assess the situation.

12. "The Gathering Storm: Angola, January-October 1975" (246-272): 
Cadelo and Morales met with MPLA leaders in Tanzania and went on to
Angola. They also checked into conditions in Mozambique. They returned
to Cuba with a letter from MPLA leaders specifying assistance
requested. This was not promptly met. The MPLA and FNLA fought. In
July, the MPLA forced the FNLA out of Luanda. Cuba readied instructors.
Zaire helped the FLNA. UNITA allied with the FLNA. The US rushed arms
to the FLNA. Portuguese troops guarded White evacuation. South Africans
advanced thirty miles to protect two major dams.

Castro communicated Angola's seriousness to the USSR. Brezhnev focused
more on detente. Portugual's Communist friendly prime minister was
replaced. A FLNA thrust at Luanda was thrown back. Some Cubans joined
in repelling renewed attacks.

13. "South Africa's Friends" (273-299): To pre-empt the emergence of
radical regimes in the wake of Portugual's collapse, South Africa made
overtures to Zambia, other states and Rhodesia and Mozambique
independence movements. South African police scaled back activities in
Rhodesia. Angola, less dependent on South Africa's economy, now seemed
threatening to South Africa's grip on Namibia.

US Secretary of State Kissinger, disregarding his experts on Africa,
achieved covert US support for the FNLA. Zaire, the UK, France and
South Africa supported UNITA and the FNLA. As MPLA successes mounted,
South Africa intensified its contribution. On October 14, 1975, it sent
an armed columb into Angola.

14 "Pretoria Meets Havana" (300-327): South African forces pushed into
Angola. Castro promptly sent hundreds of elite Cuban troops to confront
them. At Quifangondo on November 10th, Cuban artillery knocked out
South African armoured cars and scattered infantry. At Ebo on November
23rd, South Africa suffered a heavy defeat; its advance there halted.
Elsewhere Cubans blocked South Africans.

Reinforcements brought Cuban strength (3,500 to 4,000) to roughly match
South Africa's. The press was slow to notice and to report the South
African army's presence in Angola. This changed when four South African
soldiers were captured on December 13th.

15. "Cuban Victory" (328-346): US policy makers had not factored Cuba
into their Angola calculations. Congress in general had little
knowledge of, or interest in, Africa. When news of South Africa's role
became public, both US houses refused increased funding for Angolan
operations. The US and UK sent mercenaries. These were not numerous
enough, nor of adequate quality, to have an impact. MPLA and Cubans
took the North.

In the south, UNITA and FNLA turned on each other. South African troops
fell back. Promised the dams would not be damaged and presented with
the image of a black army liberating South Africa, South Africa pulled
its army out of Angola.

   "In Angola Black troops--Cubans and Angolans--have defeated White
   troops in military exchanges," a South African analyst had observed
   in February 1976. "Whether the bulk of the offensive was by Cubans
   or Angolans is immaterial in the color-conscious context of this
   war's battlefield, for the reality is that they won, are winning,
   and are not White; and that psychological edge, that advantage the
   White man has enjoyed and exploited over 300 years of colonialism
   and empire, is slipping away. White elitism has suffered an
   irreversible blow in Angola and Whites who have been there know it."
   p. 346

16. "Repercussions" (347-372): This chapter examines exaggerated Soviet
aid, excessive assumptions on UNITA's vote getting ability, Kissinger's
disregard of his advisers, his insistence on US covert action, the
media's near absent interest in Angola, and Soviet-Cuban co-operation
on Angola.

17. "Looking Back" (373-396): The enormous effort Cuba exerted in
Angola earned it esteem throughout the Continent and beyond. Even Cuban
exiles in the US were proud of Castro standing up to South Africa.
Cuba's victory led to US decision makers ceasing their quiet support of
White rule in Rhodesia. Cuba's contribution to Africa continues:

   There are, in late 2002, more than two thousand doctors in
   twenty-one African states. Living and working in the poorest areas,
   they continue to be a unique example of a poor country generously
   helping other poor countries, just as Cuba had done four decades
   ago, when the first doctors headed for Algeria. p. 393

The book has a hundred pages of notes, thirty five of bibliography
(three of archives, three of newspapers, five naming individuals
interviewed and twenty four of works cited), fifteen maps and twenty
four photographs. It is an awesome product of detailed scholarship on a
topic of tremendous relevance.

Michael McKenny, April 24-27, 2008 C.E.


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